"A drive through troubled Balochistan" Reposted from The News | November 15, 2011 | Story

(Please find Amir Mateen's article below comment.)

Wendy Johnson: CrisisBalochistan would answer Mr. Mateen's question below with a resounding 'Yes, the Frontier Corps (FC) is part of the Balochistan problem.' The FC is implicated in many, if not most, of the abductions recorded in the various databases of Baloch missing and murdered, often reported present at the scenes of these abductions.

So we are reposting this article not because of any questions we have about the detrimental role the FC plays in Balochistan, but rather because it reveals the insidious and evolving nature of the control the FC enjoys over all aspects of life in Balochistan and because we strongly disagree with the conclusion that "Yet Balochistan cannot survive without the FC."

It might be accurate to say that Pakistan cannot survive without the FC in Balochistan, but the idea that Balochistan would not survive without the FC is illogical.

Mr. Mateen notes the official line that "The provincial police and levies do not have manpower, equipment, resources and, most important, the training to meet the security challenges that exist in Balochistan." And to bolster this conclusion he cites the opinion of Major General Obaidullah Khattak (Inspector General Frontier Corps): the "nature of threat was so international and sophisticated that the ordinary forces could not match it."

First of all, Major General Obaidullah Khattak is the fox who guards the hen house. One would not expect him to hold any other point of view. But secondly, Pakistan has never been able to prove that "international" forces are behind the insurgency in Balochistan. Major General Khattak is either blind to the fact, or won't admit to himself, that the 'enemy' he faces is his own creation and that these citizen 'enemies' were born not of Indian devilry (the always-trotted-out bogeyman of Pakistani politicians), but rather failed Pakistani government, military and security agency policies towards the Baloch people.

One cannot deny that the problems in the province have become ever more complex and tortured, characterized by target killings, death squads and increasing radicalism, but for answers to such developments, one need only look into the dark soul of these same agencies and their policies.

The true-believers within these agencies may sincerely believe that Saudi-funded madrassas in Balochistan are a progressive solution to the dearth of government funding for robust secular education, and that Pakistani military support for, and harboring of, the Taliban in Balochistan will lead to the spread of tolerance, peace and progressive development, but sadly, Santa Claus doesn't exist in Pakistan any more than he did in the North Pole. As human rights advocate and former president of the Supreme Court Bar Association Asma Jahangir recently noted,"...there was no insurgency in Balochistan or ethnic and sectarian war when Musharraf pushed Balochistan towards rebellion."

We wish investigative journalists and human rights activists (including ourselves) could safely take that 'drive through troubled Balochistan' to determine the truth about what is going on behind the scenes painted by Pakistan, its military and the insurgents, but alas, as Italian journalist Francesca Marino just so rudely discovered, Pakistan's ISI makes that nearly impossible.

Realistically, one can only conclude that Pakistan has too much to hide vis-a-vis its treatment of the Baloch. We all have received open invitations from the Baloch to visit and scour its length and breadth for its stories and truths. Threats may prevent us from taking that drive, but it is NOT the nationalists or Baloch insurgents whom any of us fear.

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A drive through troubled Balochistan

by Amir Mateen

SIBBI: The Frontier Corps (FC) is under increasing scrutiny for its changing role as the guardians of Balochistan frontiers to becoming top cops and "˜guardian angels' of politics and business, provoking serious questions about its integrity and utility. The issue now is whether the FC is part of the Balochistan problem or its solution.

The force of "˜poachers-turned-wardens' created by Viceroy Lord Curzon over a century ago to man the frontiers of the British India has come a long way in becoming the most potent internal force that everybody dreads in Balochistan and not entirely for wrong reasons.

Only 40 percent of what is still named as the "˜Frontier' force is deputed at Balochistan's 906 km frontier border with Iran, 1196 km with Afghanistan and 1129 km seacoast. The majority of the 60 percent FC is now involved in internal security and guards strategic assets like Sui gasfield, Saindak and Riko Diq projects.

Now that the FC is involved in virtually everything other than its primary job "” education and health projects, mine development, tribal and political jirgas "” it has developed a love-hate relationship with Balochistan.

Most people that you talk to will have something to say against it. Politicians hate the FC because, unlike the police and levies, it is not subservient to their wishful ways. Bureaucrats see them as an alternate to their power.

Baloch separatists have reasons to hate it because, like the insurgency in the 1970s, the FC is in the forefront of the fight against the Baloch saboteurs. Pashtun traders also have reasons to dislike the FC for forcing them to share the loot at every checkpost along the Afghan borders.

Taliban too see them as an opposing force, though not as much as in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Police and levies resent the FC because the latter constantly trespasses on their authority and is generally insolent towards them. It makes perfect sense that the smuggler of drugs and arms should hate its nemesis, though most will allege that goods, vehicles and oil from Iran are mostly smuggled with the FC connivance.

Ordinary people generally see them as the people who stop them at pickets. In sum, perhaps as a consequence of wielding immense power, everybody sees the all-powerful FC as the symbol of the state in Balochistan which people blame for everything wrong around them.

Yet Balochistan cannot survive without the FC. The provincial police and levies do not have manpower, equipment, resources and, most important, the training to meet the security challenges that exist in Balochistan. Inspector General Frontier Corps (IGFC), Major General Obaidullah Khattak, was not wrong when he said in an interview at his colonial headquarters in Quetta that nature of threat was so international and sophisticated that the ordinary forces could not match it.

The FC is fighting it out simultaneously with Baloch separatists, intelligence proxies of various foreign agencies, Taliban jihadis and sectarian extremists, not to mention drugs and arms smugglers. It deserves credit for manning one of the toughest posts on planet earth. It is not easy to man the posts overlooking the Taliban nurseries on the Afghanistan border and the Jundullah sanctuaries on the edges of Iran's Seistan border. It confronts a virtual insurgency in troubled spots as far and dangerous as Panjgur, Avaran and Dera Bugti.

The FC patrols the hottest plains on planet earth around Sibbi and braces the coldest winds of Siberia around the Quetta valley, not to forget the narrow gorges of the historical Bolan Pass and the daunting cliffs around Khuzdar.

It may seem like a problem sometime but it is the Balochistan government that has requisitioned the FC. "Given a choice we would like to get the FC out of internal security," said the IGFC. "But we can't leave the security unattended."

Balochistan cannot live without the FC but its extension into politics and civilian jurisdiction is causing grave problems. One issue is that this interaction is corrupting the institution, which has long-term consequences for the FC, the army as an institution and the state.

Travelling with an FC convoy through half the breadth of Balochistan brought forth the corrupt and deviant ways that have become an acceptable routine in the institution. A whole network of oil smuggling from Iranian border of Taftan to as far as Multan in Punjab operates with the FC as a partner. The disturbing thing was that it was not just one-off case of corruption that is so rampant in Balochistan. It was an organised operation with formal bookkeeping supervised by the officer class involving billions of rupees.

It transpired that a petrol or diesel tanker that travels from Taftan carries from 15,000 to 20,000 litres of fuel which values about Rs1.3 million. Most passenger buses commuting between Taftan and Kashmore also have an extra tank that can carry as much as 3500 litres of fuel. This makes them a moving inferno in case of an accident or sabotage. Every tanker pays Rs2000 and a bus Rs300 on every checkpost of the FC, police and levies, which makes the smuggler save roughly half of the profits.

The FC has about 50 checkposts and levies another 50 and the police about 20. The FC staffers on the posts were asked in the presence of army officers about the operation. Since I had not committed that I would not ask questions and the staff thinking that they were supposed to tell the truth to the convoy, they were quite upfront in confirming everything. They added to our knowledge that sometimes tanker pay upfront at Taftan after which a special coupon is released. This ensures that are not charged anywhere between Taftan and Kashmor. A record is maintained for every vehicle at every post so that the lower staff cannot embezzle and is tallied every day. Every person in the unit from the top to bottom gets his share.

"What if there is an honest officer," an FC staffer was asked in front of his very uncomfortable superiors. "It's like a wrench in the works but he does not survive long, sir," he disclosed obediently. He was sure that the money went to the level of his unit commandant but was not sure how far beyond that. This was also checked along the 1000 km route from tanker and bus drivers and from police checkposts again in front of the army officers.

Around 100 tankers and 40 buses ply on this road daily. Similar arrangements are in place on the road towards Pakhtunkhwa Khyber via Zhob and Afghanistan through Naushki. If one calculates, the scale of the smuggling is worth billions of rupees.

The IGFC when asked about this said: "I can vouch that nobody from the headquarters was involved". But how about the people outsider the headquarters, he was asked. The general said he did not realize the scale of the trade was so much. He had not been "˜fussy' about it because in the areas adjoining the Iranian border it was the bread and butter for people as everybody was using cheap oil. "If I were to become overly strict, this might set the whole areas on fire." The IGFC was not wrong there but the issue was much bigger than that.