Original article at The Baloch Hal | October 12, 2010 | Original article

by Shehrbano Taseer

In the wee hours of August 7, allegedly hundreds of villages in Upper Sindh and Balochistan were intentionally inundated by the Pakistan army and Washington in order to save the Shahbaz airbase outside of Jacobabad, where the U.S is believed to have landing rights.

Former Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali maintained that the Tori embankment was breached, and part of it had to do with malicious intentions against Balochistan. The PAF and the U.S Embassy in Islamabad have said that the Shahbaz airbase is "commanded and operated by PAF forces." The Supreme Court, however, has launched an inquiry into the matter.

If the allegations are true, they highlight a massive contradiction in U.S policy with its ally in the war on terror. On one hand, the U.S has provided over $268 million in flood relief and recovery efforts to Pakistan thus far. On the other, it is being blamed for mercilessly giving orders which displaced an additional 800,000 people and destroyed hundreds of villages. It does not help the U.S' case that five people were mistakenly killed and two injured by a NATO shelling in Kurram a few days ago.

Jamali's allegations highlight the prickliness of most Balochis, sensitivities that have been cultivated through years of immense alienation and injustice by the Pakistan government and army towards its youngest, most underdeveloped, and insurgency-riddled province. If the allegations in Bob Woodwards' latest book Obama's Wars is true, and the U.S is fighting a proxy war in Balochistan to capture Taliban leader Mullah Umar, then it will need Balochistan's support. It seems unlikely that it will be able to do so.

The Shahbaz airbase, located on the border between Sindh and Balochistan, has been used along with Dalbandin and Pasni airbases by the U.S and allied forces to support the Operation Enduring Freedom campaign launched in Afghanistan in 2001. Reportedly, the site has been used for launching UAV air strikes in FATA and for conducting research and development for drone-related programs. An exposé in February 2009 by Google Earth revealed the drones landing and taking off from Shahbaz and Shamsi airbases. It is also widely known that the United States has created contracts to provide both Shamsi and Shabaz with F34 and JP4 jet fuels. Additionally, in June, U.S. and Pakistani officials commemorated the delivery of the first three of eighteen new F-16 aircraft to the Shahbaz Air Base near Jacobabad, Pakistan.

The Tori incident has caused a surge of anger in Balochi nationalists and seperatists, who believe it to be part of a conspiracy targeting Balochistan. Jamali, however, is not a secessionist and is considerably pragmatic. His statements, then, seem to reflect a sensitivity that is not surprising given conflict-ridden Balochistan's consistent estrangement from Pakistani national discourse.

Balochistan has been marred in conflict for years in an ongoing battle between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistan government. Recently, seperatists have clashed with Iran over the region. Pakistan has often accused the revels of being supported by their rival, India.

During the 1947 Partition, Balochis advocated claims for an independent Kalat State, not wanting to join Pakistan. Prince Abdul Karim, the younger brother of the Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, organized a guerilla campaign against the Pakistani forces, which was crushed by June 1948, securing Kalat and the rest of Balochistan as part of Pakistan.

Ten years later, Baloch objections to One Unit plan launched by then Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali which aimed to merge the four provinces of West Pakistan into one homogeneous unit - viewed as a centralist measure that undermined their provincial rights at the time - led to another violent confrontation. The Pakistan army was again victorious.

Then, in 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided to dismiss Balochistan's first ever elected government causing further outrage among the Baloch population. When they mounted for action with about 55,000 rebels, they were crushed by the brute force of about 80,000 troops.

Baloch resentment continued to build. They felt they were being denied Sui gas royalties, and opposed the development of Gwadar Port when Islamabad refused to address their reservations (which turned out to be a massive failure) and the building of military garrisons in Balochistan. Their 2000 surge led to a deployment of Pakistani army troops in Balochistan.

A number of events after that - daily rocket attacks by Bugti tribesmen on gas installations in reaction to the rape of a female doctor allegedly by a military captain and accusations of surreptitious murders by the Pakistan army - led Musharraf to send Chaudry Shujaat and Mushahid Husain to negotiate with the Baloch tribal leaders. The talks failed.

In 2005, when Musharraf visited Balochistan himself, he was attacked by rockets, and retaliated, killing Nawab Akbar Bugti, a former Baloch governor and chief minister who advocated greater provincial autonomy. This held great symbolic purpose: it showed the supremacy of the Pakistan army, and killed one of the last few figureheads, leading Balochs to become frustrated with nationalism, and turn to radical tactics to retaliate. Balochi's-and many other Pakistani's-have not yet forgiven Musharraf.

Just recently, Rahman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, accused the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Student Organization (BSO) of disrupting the democratic process in Balochistan. Holding them responsible for target killings, he threatened to conduct a "Swat-like operation" and move more FC troops into the province.

Prime Minister Gilani, however, came out with a statement the next day, saying that his government had no such intentions. Gilani, to his credit, has attempted to listen to redress Balochi concerns and include them in national discourse. All in vain, of course.

Balochistan may be ignored by Pakistan leadership and by most Pakistanis, but it has gained much traction in the foreign media as of late. The CIA and U.S military are diverting their attention to Balochistan now, where Mullah Umar, a leader of the Quetta Shurra militant organization, is believed to be hiding. Bob Woodwards latest book, "Obama's Wars" has caused a stir by claiming that the U.S is running a proxy war in Balochistan. No doubt, the U.S requires the support of the Balochistan government to continue this. The U.S-Baloch relationship, however, is marred in paradox.

Balochistan is a province with an increasing influence of pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and by nationalists and seperatists who have issues with the Pakistani government and army, and its ally, the U.S. Traditionally. The Balochs have also looked over the years to the Soviet Union for ideological guidance, and will be inclined to be on their side given the Washington-Moscow turbulent history.

The right-wing JUI apparently resented the establishment of a proposed U.S consulate in Quetta, because they did not want to support Blackwater. Yet, Shamsi airbase is located in Balochistan and, as aforementioned, is a site for drone launching.

The Americans have not paid much attention to the Baloch needs yet. So the question of who would support America in Balochistan is confusing. No doubt, the U.S government will need the support of Balochistan against the religious fanatics. Now, with the Tori embankment breach- the latest in Baloch complaints and misgivings against Pakistani leadership, believed to be ordered by Washington- one can imagine that the Balochs will be far from cooperative.

(The writer is a recent graduate of Smith College with a BA in Government and Film Studies. She submitted this article exclusively to The Baloch Hal)

The writer is a recent graduate of Smith College with a BA in Government and Film Studies. This article was an exclusive to The Baloch Hal.

Original article